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Introduction
How is probability related to logic? Should probability and logic be combined? If so,
how?
Bayesianism tells us we ought to reason probabilistically. In that sense, probability the-
ory is logic. How then does probability theory relate to classical logic and the various
non-classical logics that also stake a claim on normative reasoning? Is probability theory
to be preferred over other logics or vice versa? Is probability theory to be used in some
situations, and the other logics in other situations? Or should probability be combined with
other logics?
These questions were important in the time of Augustus de Morgan. Indeed de Morgan
himself argued that Aristotelian logic was unnecessarily restrictive in scope, and with his
contemporary George Boole he began to broaden its horizons, initiating a renaissance in
logic. The title of his most important book bears witness to his vision of a comprehensive
logic encompassing probability: “Formal Logic; or the calculus of Inference, Necessary,
and Probable”.
While the above questions are not new, we now urgently require some answers. Artificial
intelligence is one key discipline in which probability theory competes with other logics
for application. It is becoming vitally important to evaluate and integrate systems that are
based on very different approaches to reasoning, and there is strong demand for theoretical
understanding of the relationships between these approaches.
The aim of this volume is to address the relationship between probability and logic from
an interdisciplinary perspective. We hope that the themes presented here will be of interest
to mathematicians, logicians, philosophers, computer scientists and engineers.
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This issueThe papers presented here elucidate two key ways in which one can tackle the question
of the relationship between probability and logic. One approach is to argue that proba-
bility is logic, which requires showing that probability is a determinate relation between
statements. Kyburg, Howson and Paris and Vencovská appeal to the concepts of frequency,
consistency and entropy respectively to determine this relation. Alternatively one can ex-
plore other formalisms which interface between probability and logic: argumentation in
the case of Fox and Kohlas; default reasoning in the case of Bourne and Weydert.
In ‘Are There Degrees of Belief?’, Henry Kyburg assesses John Maynard Keynes’ view
that probability is a logical relationship between premiss and conclusion: the degree to
which the premiss entails the conclusion. How do we ascertain such probabilities? Keynes
suggested that we intuit them, and that we can also apply the principle of indifference to
measure them. The appeal to intuition was attacked by Frank Ramsey, while the principle
of indifference faces a number of difficulties and Keynes accepted that its use is at best
limited. Kyburg argues that we can use frequencies to determine logical probabilities and
endorses Keynes’ view that probabilities need not be point-valued: the frequency approach
leads naturally to interval-valued probabilities.
Ramsey developed his own logical view of probability, arguing that degrees of belief
must satisfy the laws of probability on pain of inconsistency. Colin Howson develops this
position in ‘Probability and Logic’, emphasising the parallels between probability and de-
ductive logic, and arguing in favour of a unified conception of logic based around the
notion of consistency: ‘the logic of consistent assignments of truth-values subject to the
usual classical truth-definition constraints is deductive logic; the logic of consistent as-
signments of uncertainty-values, subject to the appropriate constraints on these, will be
probabilistic logic’.
Rudolf Carnap developed Keynes’ idea that premisses determine the probability of a
conclusion but struggled to identify the ‘logical’ probability function that relates premiss
and conclusion, narrowing it down only to a continuum of probability functions. Edwin
Jaynes proposed the maximum entropy function as the logical probability function if the
domain is finite (this is the probability function that represents the premisses but is other-
wise maximally non-committal, degree of non-commitment or uncertainty normally being
measured by entropy), but he could only extend this proposal to infinite domains in prob-
lems in which there are a number of obvious invariances. In ‘The Emergence of Reasons
Conjecture’, Jeff Paris and Alena Vencovská conjecture (i) by taking the limit of maximum
entropy functions on finite logical languages, one can identify a logical probability func-
tion on a logical language containing finitely many propositional variables, finitely many
monadic predicates but infinitely many constants; (ii) whatever the actual form of the pre-
misses, the logical function is the same as one derived from a ‘complete set of reasons’,
i.e., constraints that take the form of probabilities of instantiated predicates conditional on
mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses (the reasons). Paris and Vencovská prove
this conjecture for the case in which there is a single monadic predicate and premisses
involving no more than two constants.
While for Howson consistency provides an umbrella under which deductive logic and
probabilistic logic shelter, for John Fox argumentation plays this role. Arguments are the
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bread and butter of logic, and they are deductive or inductive according to whether they
have certain or uncertain premisses and conclusions. Fox argues in ‘Probability, Logic
and the Cognitive Foundations of Rational Belief’ that quantitative probabilistic argu-
ments do not exhaust the realm of the inductive—uncertain reasoning may be qualitative
or semi-quantitative and it may be non-probabilistic, dealing with other ‘p-modals’ such as
possibility and plausibility. Fox provides examples of the argumentation approach applied
to medical decision making, and uses non-classical logic to formalise a logic of argument.
Jürg Kohlas takes the argumentation approach as his starting point in ‘Probabilistic
Argumentation Systems: a New Way to Combine Logic with Probability’. While most
frameworks for argumentation weigh up qualitative arguments in favour of or against a
hypothesis, Kohlas’ approach is quantitative: the reliability of an argument is measured
probabilistically and then the arguments are aggregated to measure the degree of support
of a hypothesis. The arguments themselves are presented in the language of ‘information
systems’, which generalises several formalisms including propositional logic and systems
of linear equations. ‘Information algebras’ are then used to represent and aggregate the
probabilities which attach to arguments. The way probability is handled in Kohlas’ formal-
ism bears a natural correspondence with the Dempster–Shafer approach to uncertainty.
Default reasoning provides another bridge between probability and logic. Reasoning
to a conclusion which holds only by default is a qualitative or semi-quantitative logical
process (probabilities are not used explicitly), although it is non-deductive. In fact default
reasoning behaves as an inductive logic under the maximum entropy semantics presented
by Rachel Bourne in ‘Explaining Default Intuitions using Maximum Entropy’. Here the de-
fault conclusion is the conclusion that is most probable according to the maximum entropy
probability function. In fact Bourne advocates an extension of the maximum entropy ap-
proach which allows premisses and conclusions to have variable strengths associated with
them. This system, Bourne argues, can be used as a benchmark with which to evaluate
intuitions behind other default logics.
Bourne’s variable strengths allow defaults to be ranked in order of strength. In ‘Sys-
tem JLZ—Ranking Default Reasoning by Minimal Ranking Constructions’, Emil Weydert
uses rankings to provide an alternative framework for default reasoning. There is a natural
correspondence between rankings and (non-standard) probability assignments and so prob-
abilistic operations such as conditionalisation induce corresponding ranking operations.
Weydert extends Wolfgang Spohn’s ranking conditionalisation to his own ‘J’ framework
but argues that the resulting default conclusions are too cautious and so introduces his
‘JLZ’ system. Weydert compares his approach to other strategies for default reasoning and
argues that the maximum entropy approach is too sensitive to small changes in strengths
of defaults.
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